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I. Executive Summary
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has 
vast amounts of data available, but its ultimate 
value cannot be realized without powerful 
technologies for knowledge discovery to enable 
better decision making by analysts. Past evidence 
has shown that terrorist activities leave detectable 
footprints, but these footprints generally have 
not been discovered until the opportunity for 
maximum benefit has passed. The challenge faced 
by the DHS is to discover the money transfers, 
border crossings, and other activities in advance 
of an attack and use that information to identify 
potential threats and vulnerabilities. 
The data to be analyzed by DHS comes from 
many sources ranging from news feeds, to raw 
sensors, to intelligence reports, and more. The 
amount of data is staggering; some estimates 
place the number of entities to be processed at 
1015. The uses for the data are varied as well, 
including entity tracking over space and time, 
identifying complex and evolving relationships 
between entities, and identifying organization 
structure, to name a few. Because they are ideal for 
representing relationship and linkage information, 
semantic graphs have emerged as a key technology 
for fusing and organizing DHS data.  A semantic 
graph organizes relational data by using nodes 
to represent entities and edges to connect related 
entities. Hidden relationships in the data are 
then uncovered by examining the structure and 
properties of the semantic graph.
The DHS has three primary missions: to prevent 
terrorist attacks within the United States, to reduce 
America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and to 
minimize the damage from potential attacks and 
natural disasters. The Directorate of Science and 
Technology (S&T) serves as the primary research 
and development arm of Homeland Security, 
and the Threat and Vulnerability, Testing and 
Assessment (TVTA) portfolio within S&T creates 
advanced modeling, information and analysis 
capabilities to evaluate extensive amounts of data 
and information from diverse sources. Within 
TVTA, the Advanced Scientific Computing (ASC) 
program serves as a research and development arm 
to develop innovative computational technologies 
for deployment in next-generation homeland 
security applications. 
The ASC program sponsored a workshop on 
September 22-23, 2004 in Alexandria, Virginia, 
with the purpose of identifying and elucidating the 
future R&D needs of the DHS in the data sciences. 
The workshop brought together approximately 
50 invited participants, representing the DHS, the 
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and its national 
laboratories, academia, and industry. This report 
summarizes the findings of the workshop.
The R&D needs identified by the workshop focus 
on semantic graph technologies. Semantic graphs 
are at the core of the Analysis, Dissemination, 
Visualization, Insight, and Semantic Enhancement 
(ADVISE) thrust area in TVTA. This thrust area 
will provide a common platform that supports 
scalable knowledge management across multiple 
missions. It will have an integrated suite of tools 
for the analyst, including visualization and query 
interfaces, as well as methods for ingesting data 
and integrating disparate data sources.  
Although semantic graphs are not a new concept, 
the DHS faces unique challenges due to the 
scale of the data and the complex knowledge 
discovery needs inherent in the homeland security 
mission.  The development of an R&D program 
encompassing the following five areas will greatly 
advance the DHS’s capabilities in fulfilling its 
mission to prevent terrorist attacks and reduce the 
nation’s vulnerability to terrorism:
1. Architecture and management of databases 
for large-scale semantic graphs, including 
issues associated with distributed databases, 
ingestion of large volumes of data from both 
structured and unstructured sources, and 
integration of data from different sources with 
different representations.
I. Executive Summary
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2. Scalable algorithms and interfaces for 
information retrieval and analysis on 
semantic graphs, such as scalable algorithms 
for the discovery of complex relationships 
between nodes, an efficient query language 
for semantic graphs, scalable visualization 
tools and intuitive user interfaces, and the 
integration of simulation results.
3. Models for detection and prediction 
on semantic graphs, including detection 
of missing or incorrect data; statistical 
prediction of attributes, links and subgraph 
patterns; identification of anomalous nodes 
or relationships; and models that incorporate 
temporal or spatial effects.
4. Models for discovering and detecting 
processes on graphs, such as statistical and 
machine learning models for determining 
organization structure, finding portions of the 
graph that are undergoing abrupt changes, and 
using processes to aid in analysis.
5. Algorithms to provably ensure privacy 
and security, including the development of 
policies that account for multiple levels of 
trust and access, new anonymization methods 
with provable privacy guarantees, and 
development of models that allow for trade-
offs between privacy and national security.
Supporting the highest caliber research is critical 
to the success of this R&D program. To attract the 
best researchers, the DHS should provide strong 
support for open research, release test data for 
competitive analysis, and establish programs for 
exchanges between researchers and analysts, for 
postdoctoral fellowships, and for summer research 
institutes to focus on critical research problems. 
II. Introduction
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II. Introduction
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
has three primary missions: to prevent terrorist 
attacks within the United States, to reduce 
America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and to 
minimize the damage from potential attacks and 
natural disasters. The Directorate of Science and 
Technology (S&T) serves as the primary research 
and development arm of Homeland Security. The 
Threat and Vulnerability, Testing and Assessment 
(TVTA) portfolio within S&T creates advanced 
modeling, information and analysis capabilities 
that are used to enhance S&T’s ability to evaluate 
extensive amounts of data and information from 
diverse sources. Within TVTA, the Advanced 
Scientific Computing (ASC) program provides 
computing expertise and capabilities for homeland 
security; its mission is to develop innovative 
computational technologies for deployment in 
next-generation homeland security applications. 
This report outlines research and development 
(R&D) objectives on semantic graph technologies 
for the ASC program, in support of the missions of 
DHS. In this chapter, each of the DHS components 
mentioned above is described and an outline of the 
remainder of the document is provided.
To support its primary missions, the DHS 
leverages resources within federal, state, and 
local governments, coordinating the transition 
of multiple agencies and programs into a 
single, integrated agency focused on protecting 
the American people and their homeland. 
More than 87,000 different governmental 
jurisdictions at the federal, state, and local level 
have homeland security responsibilities. The 
comprehensive national strategy seeks to develop 
a complementary system connecting all levels of 
government without duplicating effort.7
The S&T directorate serves as the primary 
R&D arm of DHS, using our nation’s scientific 
and technological resources to provide federal, 
state, and local officials with the technology 
and capabilities to protect the homeland. The 
focus is on catastrophic terrorism—threats to 
the security of our homeland that could result 
in large-scale loss of life and major economic 
impact. S&T’s work is designed to counter those 
threats with evolutionary improvements to current 
technological capabilities and development of 
revolutionary technological capabilities. It unifies 
and coordinates much of the federal government’s 
efforts to develop and implement scientific 
and technological countermeasures, including 
channeling the intellectual energy and extensive 
capacity of scientific institutions, such as the 
national laboratories and academic institutions.7
The TVTA portfolio within S&T creates 
advanced modeling, information and analysis 
capabilities, which includes advancing the nation’s 
capabilities in weapons of mass destruction 
intelligence analysis; developing capabilities in 
advanced supercomputing; creating advanced 
systems capable of merging terrorist threat 
data with infrastructure vulnerability data to 
improve warning and response; and integrating 
analytic, scientific and technological resources in 
performing net assessments of capabilities versus 
known or projected threats. 8,9 
The TVTA program uses a strategy of multi-
year investments that infuse new capabilities 
into the DHS mission directorates on a regular 
basis based on strategic five-year road maps. 
A spiral development process ensures early use 
and feedback by intended users and operators 
7 From the DHS Web site at http://www.dhs.gov 8 From the statement of Under Secretary Dr. Charles E. 
McQuery, DHS S&T Directorate, before the House Select 
Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on 
Cybersecurity, Science, and Research and Development on 
May 21, 2003.
9 From the ORAU Web site at:
http://www.orau.gov/dhsed/04abstracts.htm
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of all technologies developed within the 
program. Successively, more complete and 
refined prototypes lead to operational pilots and 
fully operational systems for the department 
organizations.8
Within the TVTA, the mission of the ASC 
program is to develop innovative computational 
technologies for deployment in next-generation 
homeland security applications. A strategic 
planning process conducted by the S&T 
Directorate in the Spring of 2004 identified 
four strategic focus areas in advanced scientific 
computing that will be required to meet DHS 
needs:Integrated simulation analysis capabilities, 
scalable information management and knowledge 
discovery, scalable discrete mathematics, and 
high-performance computing resources. 
To meet these needs, ASC has recommended the 
formation of the Institute for Discrete Sciences 
(IDS), a virtual center that will engage academia 
as well as the national laboratories. The initial 
focus of the IDS will be on TVTA programs.10
As is discussed further in Chapter I, knowledge 
management is a major component of TVTA’s 
responsibilities.  In particular, the Analysis, 
Dissemination, Visualization, Insight, and 
Semantic Enhancement (ADVISE) thrust area 
is focused on providing a common platform that 
supports scalable knowledge management across 
multiple missions. ADVISE is being developed 
in response to the needs of the DHS Information 
Sharing and Collaboration (ISC) program. The 
goal of the ISC program is to coordinate and 
facilitate efforts for enabling information sharing 
throughout DHS and with its customers and 
partners (especially the federal, state, and local 
governments). Further, other parts of S&T also 
have data sciences needs that TVTA can help 
support, including the Radiological and Nuclear 
Countermeasures (RN) portfolio.
10 From “Advanced Scientific Computing for Homeland 
Security” presented by Steve Ashby, August 5, 2004.
To fully understand the five-year R&D data 
sciences needs of TVTA, the ASC program 
sponsored a workshop on data sciences on 
September 22-23, 2004 in Alexandria, Virginia. 
The workshop brought together approximately 
50 participants, representing DHS, the U.S. 
Department of Energy (DOE) and its national 
laboratories, academia, and industry. The research 
goals identified by this team of experts are 
discussed in Chapter I. Further recommendations 
critical to bringing excellence to the R&D on data 
sciences technologies are presented in Chapter V.
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The mission of the TVTA portfolio, within 
the DHS S&T directorate is to detect elusive 
indicators of threat, assess adversary capabilities, 
understand adversary motives and behaviors, and 
relate threats with vulnerabilities to evaluate risk. 
Analysts will not be able to accomplish this task 
without the aid of more sophisticated, automatic 
tools for data analysis.
Knowledge management is an important 
component of the TVTA portfolio, and the 
ADVISE program is focused on providing 
a common platform that supports scalable 
knowledge management across multiple missions. 
The first section of this chapter (Section III.A) 
discusses ADVISE as well as a project that is 
built on top of it: the Biodefense Knowledge 
Center (BKC). Further, this section describes the 
Information Sharing and Collaboration (ISC) 
office, which DHS created to facilitate the sharing 
of data with all stakeholders. The ISC coordinates 
the data that will be fed into systems such as 
ADVISE. 
TVTA is not the only portfolio in S&T facing 
data sciences challenges. The second section 
of this chapter (Section III.B) discusses 
the needs of the Radiological and Nuclear 
Countermeasures portfolio that is doing real-time 
sensor data processing to, for example, detect 
radiation signatures of nuclear materials. The 
recommendations of this report will not focus on 
the data sciences of this type of data processing; 
however, the consideration of how to integrate this 
data with auxiliary threat information is discussed. 
For example, a radiation detector at a Canadian 
border crossing may pick up an anomalous 
reading that might be too ambiguous to trigger 
an alarm, but the incorporation of additional data 
(e.g., the driver is associated with a group known 
to be collecting nuclear materials or the same 
anomalous reading appears every week from the 
same driver and truck) would greatly improve the 
threat detection ability of these systems. 
III. Data Sciences Needs in the DHS S&T Directorate
Figure 1: Knowledge Management plays a critical role in the TVTA’s mission. It is 
used for management and planning for threat preparation, anticipation, prevention, 
detection, and restoration.11
11 From the workshop presentation of Dr. Joseph Kielman, 
DHS TVTA portfolio manager. 
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A. Threat and Vulnerability, 
Testing and Assessment 
Portfolio
The TVTA portfolio has a broad charter to help 
prepare the nation against terrorism by assessing 
threats and vulnerabilities. In his opening remarks 
at the workshop, Dr. Joseph Kielman, Portfolio 
Manager for TVTA, summarized the TVTA 
mission:
“Through science and technology, 
develop capabilities that enable the 
creation, application, and dissemination 
of knowledge to prepare for, anticipate, 
prevent, and detect terrorist activities and, 
if necessary, restore the nation’s operational 
capabilities.” 
The TVTA portfolio is sponsoring research and 
activities in the following three areas: knowledge 
management technology, social and behavioral 
sciences, and intelligence and specialized 
information (e.g., WMD and nuclear capability 
assessments). 
Knowledge management plays a critical role in 
TVTA’s mission. It is used in management and 
planning for threat preparation, anticipation, 
prevention, detection, and restoration. 
See Figure 1. 
TVTA’s goal is to develop a scalable, all-source 
knowledge management system to discover 
terrorist capabilities and threats. This system 
must process and integrate multiple types of 
data, ranging from news feeds, to raw sensors, to 
intelligence reports, and more. Multiple types of 
analyses must be supported. The system must also 
have the capability to share the analysis and the 
associated data with appropriate with federal, state, 
and local officials. The cycle that is envisioned is 
illustrated in Figure 2.
Within the domain of Knowledge Management 
Technology, TVTA is investing in fundamental 
technologies, new capabilities, and integration 
activities, as well as several pilot programs. 
ADVISE, discussed in Section III.A.1, is a thrust 
area that has been developed to support the full 
range of information fusion needs of the DHS. 
The BKC is being built on top of the infrastructure 
developed by ADVISE, as discussed in Section 
III.A.2. The ISC, on the other hand, is a sort 
of “human information fusion” program that 
brings together experts from across the DHS and 
elsewhere to facilitate information sharing; this is 
discussed in Section III.A.3.
Figure 2: The TVTA information cycle includes integration of data from various 
sources, analysis of the data, sharing with federal, state, and local officials, and 
using the data to predict threat levels and so on.11
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1. Analysis, Dissemination, Visualization, 
Insight, and Semantic Enhancement 
Analysis, Dissemination, Visualization, Insight, 
and Semantic Enhancement (ADVISE) is a system 
that is under “spiral” development (meaning 
that it is being deployed simultaneously with 
development) and will provide a common platform 
that supports scalable knowledge management 
across multiple missions; see Figure 3 for an 
illustration that shows the overall architecture. 
The system includes tools for ingesting and 
canonicalizing massive quantities of information 
from many different sources, as shown at the 
bottom of the figure. Some of the data comes 
from other databases, as indicated by the green 
cylinders. Other data comes from free-form 
text document sources that must be processed 
to discover the entities and their relationships. 
Automatic tools for event extraction are used 
for some reports but are not yet very good. 
(“Louisiana” is a system for interfacing to various 
extraction tools.) Manual extraction (aided by 
the “SPUD” tool) is still necessary for critical 
documents. 
At ADVISE’s core, semantic graphs are used to 
organize the data entities and their relationships. 
(The graph system is called “Nebraska.”) A 
semantic graph organizes relational data by using 
nodes to represent entities and edges to connect 
related entities. Hidden relationships in the 
data are uncovered by examining the structure 
and properties of the semantic graph. Privacy 
and support policies are enforced by a security 
infrastructure. Several interfaces for browsing, 
querying, and viewing the results of queries are 
under development, including IN-SPIRE and 
Starlight, from the DHS NationalVisualization and 
Analytics Center (NVAC).
The key to fusing disparate data from many 
sources in ADVISE is the exploitation of “pre-
computed” relationship information by storing the 
data in a semantic graph. All nodes are related by 
the links between them on the graph. For example, 
Figure 4 shows a simple semantic graph that links 
people (black nodes), workplaces (red nodes), and 
towns (blue nodes). The different link (or edge) 
types indicate different relationship types. 
For example, the fact that Person 13 and Person 
15 have a green link between them indicates that 
they are friends with one another, while the orange 
link from Workplace 19 to Town 22 indicates 
that Workplace 19 is located in Town 22. In 
this example, the links are all bidirectional, but 
directed links can also be used. 
Figure 3: The ADVISE architecture incorporates many different data sources and stores the data in a 
semantic graph. The sources of the data can be retrieved from the document management system. 
The data can also be visualized using tools such as IN-SPIRE and Starlight. 11
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Confidences (or uncertainties) are attributes of 
both the nodes and edges. Studying such graphs 
can help in understanding the relationships 
between entities (e.g., what’s the shortest path 
between Persons 16 and 26?) and in making 
intelligent hypotheses (e.g., Persons 15 and 14 are 
linked by a common workplace and a common 
friend, so we may hypothesize that there is a good 
chance that they should also be connected by a 
“Friends with” link).
Advanced, long-range R&D is needed to support 
ADVISE, including research on automatic 
processing of text documents, semantic graph 
representation, querying on semantic graphs, 
automatic knowledge discovery on semantic 
graphs, and methods for ensuring privacy and 
security. These topics are discussed in more detail 
and generality in Chapter I.
Several systems are built on top of the ADVISE 
architecture (see Figure 5), including the Threat 
Vulnerability Information System (TVIS) for 
the Information Analysis (IA) organization, 
the Regional Threat Analysis System (RTAS) 
for Border and Transportation Security (BTS), 
and the Biodefense Knowledge Center (BKC) 
for the National Biodefense Analysis and 
Countermeasures Center (NBACC). 
Figure 5: ADVISE will be the underlying architecture for applications in Information 
Analysis, Border Operations, and the Biodefense Knowledge Center. 11
Figure 4: An example of a semantic graph 
with three nodes types and four edge types.
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2. Biodefense Knowledge Center 
The Biodefense Knowledge Center (BKC) 
provides an interesting example of a specific 
use of the ADVISE system. The goal of the 
BKC is to create an overarching architecture 
that integrates disparate components in order to 
anticipate, prepare for, prevent, 
detect, respond to, and attribute 
biological threats. The BKC system 
will address the need for a trusted 
information sharing and analysis 
system for biodefense stakeholders. 
Current architectures for 
biodefense are limited by a number 
of concerns ranging from a lack 
of appropriate security measures 
to a lack of scalability to a lack of 
shareability. 
The BKC will provide access 
across different missions and 
stakeholders and provide critical 
links to subject matter experts 
and curated, continually updated 
information; see Figure 6. 
For the BKC, the semantic graph (see Figure 
7) will contain information for a variety of data 
sources, ranging from intelligence data to basic 
biological information (such as genomic data) to 
data on virus outbreaks and vaccine stockpiles. 
Figure 6: The BKC will connect analysts, researchers, and stakeholders 
within a trusted information network.12
Figure 7: The BKC will fuse data from disparate sources to answer 
questions regarding biological threats.12
12 From the workshop presentation of Tom Slezak, Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory
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3. Information Sharing and Collaboration  
The needs of the Information Sharing and 
Collaboration (ISC) Office provide a broader 
perspective on the needs of the DHS.
The ISC was created to address the 
stove piping of data sources across 
DHS. The mission of the ISC Program 
is to coordinate and facilitate efforts to 
enable information sharing throughout 
the DHS and with its customers and 
partners, especially the federal, state, 
and local governments as well as the 
private sector. The goal is to achieve 
an interoperable system-of-systems 
(including systems such as ADVISE) 
across the DHS enterprise that will 
facilitate the sharing of information 
with all stakeholders in a timely and 
effective manner appropriate to the 
mission needs of DHS and its partners. 
The desired end state is an integrated 
system where any employee of DHS 
can log in from any location and have 
full access (as appropriate to his or her 
access permissions). The aggregated whole will be 
independent of any particular facility or system. 
All federal, state, local, and private sector security 
entities will be able to share and collaborate in real 
time with distributed data warehouses that will 
provide full support for analysis and action. The 
ISC blueprint incorporates a “privacy and policy” 
piece that is a key to combining privacy and policy 
down to the lowest levels of information. Policy-
based filtering will provide role-based access to 
data integrated into the system.
All data will be collected into one shared analytic 
space. The data itself will be distributed across 
multiple collections (1300 distributed sources), but 
all data will potentially be available to all analysts. 
The anticipated data sources are enormous in size 
and number and come from multiple agencies. The 
data will be from both structured and unstructured 
sources. Entity and event extraction will be 
required to capture and expose the “who, what, 
and when” information from the data sources. An 
illustration of the different data sources and the 
shared analytic space is shown in Figure 8. 
The ISC has identified the following technical 
goals for its program, which are very similar to the 
goals for ADVISE:
•  High-speed information extraction of entities, 
attributes, and relations, including tracking 
entities over space and time and identification 
of “protected” entities
•  Detection of novel and relevant events
•  Detection of meaningful groups against 
models of behavior that are “of interest”
•  Graph algorithms for information retrieval on 
large-scale, distributed semantic data
•  Automated pattern learning such as learning 
expert examples of threat and non-threat 
patterns
Figure 8: The DHS Information Sharing and Collaboration office envisions 
a shared analytic space that integrates data from multiple domains.13
13 From the workshop presentation of Stephen Dennis, DHS 
ISC program deputy director for research and engineering.
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B. An example of the needs 
of other S&T portfolios: 
Radiological and Nuclear 
Countermeasures
DHS collects radiological and nuclear (RN) data 
and associated metadata at border checkpoints for 
real-time decision making to decide whether or not 
a vehicle crossing into the U.S. is carrying illegal 
RN materials. For example, Figure 9 shows a truck 
passing through a new DHS radiation portal. The 
collection, processing, use, and storage of this data 
give a sense of the diverse needs of the DHS.
For each vehicle, RN data is recorded by 
commercial devices and is stored in many different 
non-standard formats. For example, the data can 
be in the form of radiation counts, captured full or 
partial energy spectra, or identified isotopes. The 
data may be stored as simple binary information, 
formatted text, unformatted text (which is 
human-readable, but difficult to automatically 
parse), “blobs” (binary large objects, e.g., Zip file 
archives), or a set of multiple structured files (e.g., 
Microsoft Access database files). RN data also has 
been obtained at testing facilities under controlled 
conditions for analysis and studies. However, RN 
data by itself may be insufficient to determine 
whether or not a vehicle is carrying illegal RN 
materials.
Metadata on each vehicle is recorded as 
well, including information about the vehicle 
(manufacturer, model, color, and weight), the 
cargo (type, quantity, origin, and destination), 
personal information about the vehicle’s 
occupants (names, identification information), 
and environmental data (date and time, weather, 
and background measurements). This metadata 
is entered in various ways such as free-form text 
or filled-in templates that are completed by the 
customs agent and/or electronic information from 
other sources. Still images or streaming video of 
the vehicles may also be available. 
As each vehicle crosses, the DHS agent must 
make a real-time decision because commerce at 
ports of entry, in general, cannot be interrupted 
or delayed beyond the few seconds normally 
allowed to process a vehicle. The RN readings 
are often difficult for non-experts to interpret, so 
additional information (i.e., historical RN readings 
as well as the metadata) could be useful in making 
determinations on what to do. Some vehicles are 
stopped for further inspection due to suspect RN 
data, but those vehicles cannot be held for much 
more than an hour.
In fact, all the data is stored long-term for a 
posteriori data analysis, detector studies, and 
algorithm development and validation. The 
amount of data is enormous. There are gigabytes 
to terabytes of data per database because the 
data is collected continuously at border points. 
Unfortunately, at this stage, even straightforward 
operations on these data are tedious.
For example, a query such as “get all information 
from March 2nd” is difficult (or even impossible) 
to execute. On the other hand, answers are 
14 Photo Credit: Gerald L. Nino. From “Scanning for Nukes,” 
May 2004, at http://www.cbp.gov/xp/CustomsToday/2004/
May/nukeScanner.xml.
Figure 9: A truck passes through a radiation portal 
at a port in Newark, NJ. These portals collect data 
that is used to determine whether the vehicle 
is carrying illegal RN materials.14
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typically needed in a short amount of time (less 
than 1 hour) due to the impact that stopping a 
vehicle on the border has on transportation and 
commerce.  
Data stored by non-DHS agencies (such as 
data obtained at a truck weighing station) could 
be useful in making decisions. However, it is 
currently difficult to obtain such data because 
it is owned by state agencies. By and large, the 
agencies involved are cooperative, but there are 
no tools available to streamline integration and no 
resources available to provide these tools.
Finally, the current privacy and security controls 
to historical data are rudimentary and a barrier to 
the analysis that needs to be performed. Access 
is typically granted at the database level via, e.g., 
password access to the host computer. There are 
no provisions to filter the data or enable selective 
access. Because the data contains personal 
information (e.g., information about each driver) 
and trade secrets (shipment manifests), it cannot 
be easily shared. The ability to support variable 
access permissions depending on the user’s need 
to know is important.
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Semantic graphs play an important role in the 
knowledge management capabilities of the TVTA 
portfolio within the DHS S&T directorate, as 
discussed in Chapter I. Advanced, long-range 
R&D on semantic graph technologies is needed 
to support the data sciences needs of the TVTA, 
especially for thrust areas such as ADVISE 
(see Section III.A.1). The volume of data that 
must be analyzed is enormous, and the TVTA is 
responsible for providing the tools for evaluating 
that data. Current technologies are inadequate 
for the task. The technologies that exist must 
be reengineered in order to handle the massive 
amounts of data that need to be evaluated, and new 
technologies must be developed to aid in advanced 
knowledge discovery. 
Advances in the following R&D areas will provide 
great improvements to the DHS’s capabilities in 
fulfilling its mission to prevent terrorist attacks 
and reduce the nation’s vulnerability to terrorism:
A. Architecture and management of 
databases for large-scale semantic 
graphs, including issues associated with 
distributed databases, ingestion of large 
volumes of data from both structured and 
unstructured sources, and integration of 
data from different sources with different 
representations. See Section IV.A, below.
B. Scalable algorithms and interfaces 
for information retrieval and analysis 
on semantic graphs, such as scalable 
algorithms for the discovery of complex 
relationships between nodes, an efficient 
query language for semantic graphs, 
scalable visualization tools and intuitive user 
interfaces, and the integration of simulation 
results. See Section IV.B, below.
C. Models for detection and prediction 
on semantic graphs, including detection 
of missing or incorrect data, statistical 
prediction of attributes and links, 
identification of anomalous nodes or 
relationships, and models that incorporate 
temporal or spatial effects. See Section IV.C, 
below.
D. Models for discovering and detecting 
processes on graphs, such as statistical and 
machine learning models for determining 
organization structure, finding portions 
of the graph that are undergoing abrupt 
changes, and using processes to aid in 
analysis. See Section IV.D, below.
E. Algorithms to provably ensure privacy 
and security, including the development 
of policies that account for multiple levels 
of trust and access, new anonymization 
methods with provable privacy guarantees, 
and development of models that allow for 
trade-offs between privacy and national 
security. See Section IV.E, below.
Note that these focus areas do not present a 
complete picture of the R&D needs of the DHS. 
For example, little emphasis is placed on the 
processing of multimedia data although such 
processing will be required in numerous contexts 
ranging from the “US Visit” program data to aerial 
surveillance photos and more. Thus, while the 
inclusion of a particular focus area is an indication 
that the area is of critical importance to the DHS, 
its absence should not be construed as indicating 
that it is unimportant.
Critical measures to bring excellence to the R&D 
process are outlined in Chapter V.
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A. Architecture and management 
of databases for large-scale 
semantic graphs
The amount of data to be processed by the 
DHS is staggering. Some estimates put the total 
number of entities to be stored at 1015 or higher. 
The Information Sharing and Collaboration 
(ISC) office (see Section III.A.3) envisions four 
primary functions that its systems must provide 
to customers. First, users must be able to read 
source data, either through interactive queries or 
through an application programming interface 
(API), using the source structure provided by the 
original supplier. Second, users must be able to 
search and retrieve information from all integrated 
repositories. Third, there must be a capability 
to import sources by re-hosting supplier’s data 
within the DHS information space. Fourth, 
users must be able to conduct link analysis on 
structured information gleaned from sources, even 
if sources themselves are unstructured. These 
four requirements depend on the architecture and 
management of the databases.
Given the unprecedented amount of data that is 
to be stored, designing a suitable architecture and 
management system for the databases is of major 
importance. R&D is needed in the following areas, 
ordered by importance, and described in detail in 
the subsections that follow.
1. Methods for ingesting large-scale data 
streams, including filtering and entity, 
relationship, and event extraction. The 
automatic tools of today are insufficient, 
achieving low levels of precision-recall 
on complex tasks such as co-reference 
determination and event extraction. 
Algorithm developments that improve 
the level of accuracy on these tasks are 
desperately needed.
2. The identification of appropriate 
databases for storing and querying on 
large-scale, distributed semantic graphs. 
There are actually two issues here. The 
first is which type of database organization 
is most appropriate for representing the 
semantic graph. The second is how to 
best coordinate a collection of distributed 
databases for access by graph queries.
3. Methods for integrating databases that 
have different schemas and ontologies, 
as well as methods for automatically 
identifying subsets of databases that should 
be integrated.
1. Ingesting large-scale data streams
Data ingestion is the process of taking raw data 
and converting it to a format appropriate for 
storage in a database. In his presentation, Stephen 
Dennis, DHS ISC Deputy Director of Research 
and Engineering, said that the ISC expects to 
process one billion structured and one million 
unstructured text-formatted messages per hour. 
All of those who were already working with DHS 
identified the problem of automatic text processing 
as being particularly difficult. Processing such 
data is still labor intensive, as evidenced by the 
“manual event extraction” component in the 
architecture of ADVISE (see Figure 3). The 
development of more effective automatic tools 
that combine filtering with entity, relationship, 
and event extraction is critical for populating the 
DHS’s databases. 
Figure 10 illustrates the process that is needed 
to go from raw unstructured data to usable 
information. The first step (not shown) is to 
translate various types of documents (e.g., email, 
text messages, Word files, PDF files) into text 
documents, noting that it is critical to maintain any 
useful structured information such as document 
author, date, title, etc. Next, irrelevant documents 
are filtered to greatly reduce the number of 
documents that are sent for further processing and 
help to reduce the overall size of the database. 
Then the documents must be processed to discover 
information: what entities are named, how they 
are related, and what events have taken place. The 
next steps can be separate or combined, depending 
on the techniques that are employed. An example 
of entity and relationship extraction is shown in 
Figure 11.
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Prof. Andrew McCallum of the University of 
Massachusetts cited the performance of the state-
of-the-art tools to be as follows.
•  Named entity recognition 
(i.e., identifying a person, location, or 
organization) had a recall-precision rate of 
between 80-95%.
• Binary relationship extraction 
(i.e., determining Location 1 is “contained 
in” Location 2 or Person 1 is a “member of” 
Organization 1) had a recall-precision rate of 
between 60-80%, depending on the type of 
relationship.
These accuracies should be much closer to 100%. 
Inaccuracies at this early stage of processing 
should be as minimal as possible.
Another closely related topic is the development 
of methods for assigning levels of confidence. 
For example, data from controlled sources such 
as intelligence feeds may be viewed as more 
reliable than uncontrolled sources. For example, 
data from CNN’s Web site is generally viewed as 
more reliable than data from a college student’s 
blog (i.e., a Web log that contains periodic, reverse 
chronologically ordered posts on a common Web 
page.). Furthermore, the processing of the data 
may introduce uncertainties since relationships 
may be detected incorrectly.
Disambiguation and duplicate detection may also 
happen during the ingestion phases and have a 
large impact on later processing. For example, 
would two reports of the same event be stored as 
two events or one event with two reports? And 
what if those two reports are actually the same 
report, e.g., the same news story appearing in two 
newspapers? 
All the tools that are developed for ingestion must 
be able to scale to the needs of DHS. Some phases 
of the processing, such as entity extraction, can be 
done in an embarrassingly parallel fashion because 
they only involve an individual information 
unit, i.e., one document. More sophisticated 
levels of analysis, such as duplicate detection, 
require the processing of multiple sources of data 
simultaneously, making issues of scaling more 
challenging. 
Figure 10: The process of going from raw data to a semantic graph includes 
filtering, information extraction (IE), and knowledge discovery.15
15 From the workshop presentation of Prof. Andrew 
McCallum, University of Massachusetts.
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2. Appropriate databases for storing 
and querying large-scale, distributed 
semantic graphs
Once the data is ingested, the issue becomes 
one of storage. Stephen Dennis, DHS ISC 
Deputy Director of Research and Engineering, 
cited the importance of the identification of 
new architectures for efficient management of 
distributed knowledge and information. There are 
actually two major issues here. The first question 
is which type of database is most appropriate for 
storing semantic graphs—possible choices include 
relational, object-oriented, or vertical. The second 
issue is how to best implement a distributed 
semantic graph database.
Relational databases are popular because of 
their efficiency if the proper indexing is used. 
However, relational databases are not appropriate 
for every situation, and early evidence suggests 
that they may not be the most appropriate device 
for efficiently storing semantic graphs. Recall that 
a semantic graph looks something like what is 
seen in Figure 12. There is a collection of nodes 
connected by a collection of links. Each node 
and link has a type (e.g., a “Paper” node or an 
“Author” node) and possibly, though not always, 
some additional attributes. 
An ontology specifies the rules for the types of 
nodes that are allowed and the types of links that 
are allowed between different specific node types. 
The ontology for a semantic graph is analogous to 
the database schema that defines the structure of a 
database. 
Figure 11: Information extraction is used to identify entities (.e.g, “Bill Gates”), determine the entity 
type (e.g., “name”), and discover relationships (e.g., “Bills Gates is the CEO of Microsoft.”15
16 From the workshop presentation of Prof. David 
Jensen, University of Massachusetts.
Figure 12: A sample semantic graph that shows papers, 
the authors of the papers, and the citations 
between papers.16
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One of the major challenges of database (or 
semantic graph) integration is how to merge the 
schemas (or ontologies). Figure 13 shows an 
example of an ontology for a citation database. 
The ontology says that there are four types of 
nodes (Journal, Paper, Author, and Domain) 
and five types of links (Published in, Authored, 
Citation, Co-Authored, and Affiliation). 
Furthermore, the ontology specifies the rules on 
which types of links can go between which types 
of nodes. An “Authored” link can only go from an 
“Author” node to a “Paper” node.
In his presentation, Prof. David Jensen of the 
University of Massachusetts observed that 
traditional relational databases are optimized for 
row-wise access with a fixed schema, whereas 
vertical databases are optimized for column-
wise access with no fixed schema and so are 
potentially better suited for storing semantic 
graphs. In his group’s experiments, switching 
from a relational to a vertical database resulted 
in a 20 times improvement in query speed in 
addition to simplifying code development. A 
better understanding is needed of when (partial) 
schema information can be exploited and when a 
representation which makes minimal ontological 
commitment is preferred.
Whichever type of database is used, there will be 
far too much data to store on a single computer 
system. The question is how should the data best 
be distributed across multiple systems in order to 
support efficient ingestion and queries. 
In answering the above questions, the following 
related concerns must also be taken into account.
• The hardware for the distributed systems.
• Tracking the sources of all data and 
propagating changes when data is changed 
or deemed incorrect.
• Restricting access to the data to authorized 
users. The practice of controlling data 
through compartmentalization and 
classification is well known. Another 
common process is to restrict access to 
data to the organization that collects it. 
For example, data collected by one branch 
of DHS, such as immigration, may not be 
readily shared with another branch due to 
privacy and, more generally, data control 
issues. Several DHS personnel cited a need 
for data storehouses that enforce policies 
on accessing the data. (See Section IV.E for 
more on security and privacy issues.)
• Creating an audit trail by tracking all 
accesses to the data. (In fact, the size of 
the audit data could become larger than the 
original data itself.)
• The development of efficient methods for 
“retiring data.” Research must solve the 
problem of maintaining awareness and 
factoring in the applicability of information 
by its period of germaneness.
• Archiving data, especially since the 
original sources may be altered or become 
unavailable. As an example, see the Internet 
Archive project at http://www.archive.org. 
• The ability to retrieve historical data 
such as a snapshot-in-time. The Internet 
Archive has, for example, the “Wayback 
Machine,” which enables users to pull up 
past versions of any Internet Web page (http:
//www.archive.org/web/web.php).
Figure 13: An example of an ontology that specifies 
the rules for the types of nodes and the links 
that are allowed between them.16
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3. Data integration
Data integration is an important problem to DHS. 
Much of the data needed to address the DHS 
mission is distributed across multiple agencies 
(e.g., CDC, FBI, CIA, local law enforcement 
agencies, open source public data sets), is in 
multiple formats (stored in flat files, XML, HTML 
pages, and different database management systems 
using different schemas), and is multi-modal (e.g., 
unstructured text, video, speech, call records); 
see Figure 14. The data is distributed at multiple 
levels of granularity (e.g., hourly vs. weekly, 
city vs.state, gene vs. disease), confidence (some 
more trustworthy than others), classification, and 
privacy sensitivity (e.g., citizen vs. non-citizen 
data, open source vs. private data). 
Most of the DHS knowledge discovery 
applications require the fusion of multiple different 
kinds of data. Some data is already in structured 
databases, but other data consists of unstructured 
text, images, transactions, relationships, biological 
strings, spectra, etc. Diversity of data is not 
unique to DHS, and special purpose solutions 
for data integration can be found in a variety of 
commercial and academic settings. However, the 
breadth of DHS data types, the dispersed nature 
of the data repositories, the highly dynamic nature 
of the data, and the mixture of classification and 
privacy concerns make the DHS data integration 
problems particularly difficult.
There are three general techniques to performing 
data integration:
• Moving the data to a central location (such 
as data warehouses or data marts)
• Accessing distributed data sources 
dynamically (such as in federated databases 
or a multi-database infrastructure)
• Peer-to-peer data management.
Each of these approaches has benefits and 
shortcomings. For example, the centralized data 
management approach can lead to very large 
databases, which can be difficult to maintain in 
the face of continually evolving data. Similarly, 
distributed data approaches have issues with 
security and reliable access to the remote sites. As 
a result, hybrid systems are evolving that combine 
desired characteristics from each of these basic 
approaches. 
Figure 14: The diversity of data that might be needed to answer a single query includes formatted files, 
raw text files, image data, and various other databases.17
17 From the workshop presentation of Prof. Susan 
Davidson, University of Pennsylvannia.
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Virtually every database or semantic graph has 
its own schema or ontology, and the development 
of methods for integrating data with different 
ontologies is an important need. The ability to 
learn schema mappings and transfer mappings 
from one related domain to another is essential to 
achieve the scaling factors required by DHS.
Most current data integration systems do not 
fully support multi-modal data integration, e.g., 
a single query that should combine information 
from a relational database, a collection of free 
text documents, and a set of images. While some 
primitive functionality exists, the capabilities 
of these systems lag far behind those of tools 
developed specifically for a single modality, and 
this capability gap must be reduced. 
Since much of the information that is being 
processed may be incorrect in some way or 
another, integration provides potential to better 
understand the certainty of the information. For 
example, confidence in a “fact” may become 
higher if that fact appears in multiple databases. 
Of course, such a simple rule can be misleading 
if all databases have used the same source as a 
basis for the fact. Thus, it is important to track the 
provenance of the data, i.e., where it originated, 
and use that information during the integration 
process so that the chance of over-valuing 
information from a single source is reduced. 
Another issue in integration is disambiguation, 
i.e., deciding if two entities are the same. Most 
techniques that exist today are fairly limited 
in their abilities because they do not take all 
the relational information into account. The 
development of new techniques in this regard 
will help both in the integration of existing 
databases as well as in the integration of data into 
an existing database.
B. Scalable algorithms and 
interfaces for information 
retrieval and analysis on 
semantic graphs
Semantic graphs are graphical structures that 
display relationships between entities. In 
particular, a semantic graph consists of nodes (i.e., 
entities) and links (i.e., relationships). See Figure 
4 and Figure 12 for examples. Each node and link 
is categorized to be of a particular type and may 
additionally be characterized by different sets of 
attributes. For example, a “Person” node could 
have a “Last Name” and “Zip Code” attributes. 
Many real-world semantic graphs that DHS would 
use have the following properties.
• They are large-scale with billions of nodes 
and links and thousands of node and link 
types.
• They may have “influential nodes,” i.e., 
nodes that are closely connected to many 
other nodes.
• They encode (sometimes unknown) 
community structures.
• They are stored in physically distributed 
systems, mainly due to their massive size.
• They are noisy and incomplete.
• They may have weights on the nodes 
and links that measure uncertainty (or 
alternatively confidence) associated with the 
facts and relations.
• They are dynamic, changing as new facts 
and relations become known and old facts 
and relations become irrelevant.
Developing scalable algorithms and interfaces 
for information retrieval on semantic graph data 
is important for supporting DHS architectures 
such as ADVISE (see Section III.A.1) that are 
based on semantic graphs. In this case, scalable 
means that the algorithms can be applied to graphs 
with billions of nodes and links. In his workshop 
presentation, Prof. David Jensen of the University 
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of Massachusetts said, “Existing commercial 
tools are well-developed, widely deployed, and 
nearly useless for analyzing semantic graphs.” 
Thus, development of tools for analyzing semantic 
graphs is critical. The most important R&D areas 
are the following, listed in order of importance.
1. Scalable algorithms for relationship 
analysis, such as solving shortest path 
problems. Relationship analysis algorithms 
are fundamental tools for analysts but still 
require substantial computational time 
because of the difficulty of adapting these 
algorithms to large-scale semantic graphs.
2. Development of scalable and intuitive 
user interfaces is critical for allowing the 
analyst to use the data to “connect the dots.” 
This means not only making it easy for 
the user to express queries, but presenting 
results in a manner that can be easily 
understood.
3. Connecting modeling and simulation to 
use the data obtained from the semantic 
graphs.
1. Scalable algorithms for relationship 
analysis
Developing scalable algorithms for relationship 
analysis on semantic graphs was identified as 
an important need by Dr. Joseph Kielman, DHS 
TVTA portfolio manager, in his opening remarks 
as well as in the presentation on ADVISE. Graph 
algorithms need to be extended to work on large-
scale graphs where even algorithms that execute 
in linear time in the number of nodes may be too 
expensive. Many traditional graph algorithms 
are not only not linear, they are NP-hard (e.g., 
subgraph isomorphism, maximum and maximal 
cliques). 
In many cases, algorithms that give approximate 
answers need to be devised. Entirely novel 
graph algorithms need to be developed that are 
appropriate for the types of analysis that will be 
done on semantic graphs, such as algorithms that 
find the web of connections between two people. 
Consider the shortest path problem. The goal 
is to find the shortest path between two nodes. 
Figure 15 shows an example of the shortest path 
between Person 13 and Person 25. The shortest 
path between two entities can be used to try and 
understand their relationship. The shortest path 
problem is well studied on smaller graphs without 
semantic structure. 
However, much work remains to be done on 
adapting shortest path algorithms to semantic 
graphs. For example, it may be possible to exploit 
ontological information. Alternatively, different 
types of nodes and edge types should be treated 
differently. For example, it may be that the 
analyst wishes to ignore all “Located in” edges in 
computing the shortest path shown in Figure 15, 
which would substantially change the solution 
to the problem. Or, different edge and nodes 
types may be weighted differently to reflect the 
relative importance of each type of connection. 
It is important to note that even the shortest path 
algorithms that exist in the (non-semantic) graph 
case do not yet scale adequately to very large 
graphs.
Shortest paths are just one way to analyze a 
relationship, but shortest path and its ilk are 
not the most interesting or relevant methods to 
understand the broader connections between 
Figure 15: The shortest path between two people is one 
way of understanding their relationship. The figure shows 
the shortest path from Person 13 to Person 25.
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entities. The problem with shortest path is 
obvious: Two individuals may be related by a 
single commonality (e.g., a common acquaintance) 
but have no deeper relationship. One answer is to 
look at all short paths (where “short” is defined 
by a pre-specified maximum length) between two 
nodes, which has been identified as a specific goal 
of the ADVISE program. 
Researchers at IBM Almaden Research Center 
have proposed a more general approach, called the 
“connection subgraph.”19 Here the idea is to find 
a graph with some maximum number of vertices 
(as opposed to edges) that shows the various 
relationships between two nodes. Figure 16 
shows an example of what might be returned by a 
connection subgraph; the red and blue nodes are 
not directly connected but are connected by three 
relatively short and significant paths. 
2. Scalable and intuitive user interfaces for 
querying and browsing semantic graphs
Although semantic graphs are potentially a 
powerful tool for aiding in decision analysis, the 
analysts must be able to express their queries 
and view the results in some sort of intuitive and 
meaningful fashion. Workshop participants noted 
that effective query interfaces—both manual and 
automatic—are crucial for achieving customer 
adoption. Deep integration of researchers into the 
customer environment was cited as one way to 
develop a customer-friendly interface.
Though the development of an infrastructure for 
querying on semantic graphs is still in its infancy 
and needs further investment, Prof. David Jensen 
of the University of Massachusetts discussed the 
idea of a visual language for querying graphs and 
cited his group’s work on QGraph as an example. 
Figure 17 shows an example of a visual query on 
a graph.
Several workshop participants noted that 
visualization of results, particularly results 
deriving from graphs, is problematic. Often a 
query amounts to the selection of one or more 
subgraphs. However, when the graphs are massive, 
the subgraphs that are returned by a query can 
themselves be extraordinarily large, making 
it difficult to know how to best refine further 
analysis. The proper tools for exploring relatively 
large graphs, such as those returned from a query, 
are critical for DHS analysts.
Any query infrastructure that is designed, be it 
visual or otherwise, must be efficient to be adopted 
by users. This means that it should translate the 
queries into efficient operations and include built-
in support for common queries such as shortest 
path. Query response speed is extremely important 
for customer adoption.18 From the workshop presentation of Prof. Jon Kleinberg, 
Cornell University.
19 See, for example, Faloutsos, McCurley, and Tomkins, 
Connection subgraphs on IBM WebFountain Data, 2004.
Figure 17: Visual queries may be the optimal way for 
analysts to work with semantic graphs. This figure shows 
an example of a visual query on a graph.16
Figure 16: A connection subgraph is an alternative way 
of showing the connection between two people 
by showing multiple paths.18
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3. Connecting modeling and simulation
Information from models and simulations can 
also be quite useful to an analyst. For example, a 
simulation of the effect of a chemical release in 
an air duct may help in planning for evacuations. 
The data from modeling and simulations, however, 
is generally stored in table form rather than as 
a semantic graph. For example, the raw RN 
sensor data discussed in Section III.B is more 
appropriately represented in standard databases. 
There are several scenarios in which it may 
be necessary to integrate relational data from 
a semantic graph and non-relational data from 
modeling and simulation.
• Modeling and simulation results can be used 
in the analysis of patterns. For example, 
it might be worthwhile to compare the 
results of the RN scan of a truck at a border 
crossing with known RN scans or prior 
history. The results of these analyses need 
to be combined with the relational data to 
provide a complete picture.
• Modeling and simulation may use data 
from the semantic graph as input data. For 
instance, if certain chemicals are purchased 
by known terrorists, simulations may help 
determine the level of threat posed by the 
purchased chemicals. For example, the 
analysts may simulate a chemical weapon in 
a subway system.
4. Crosscutting issues: scalability, 
accounting for measures of uncertainty, 
and including temporal or spatial 
phenomena
In addressing the challenges outlined above, 
several other issues should be considered.
• Scalability – Scaling to the enormous data 
sets of interest to DHS.
• Uncertainty – Methods for handling 
uncertainty should be incorporated into the 
algorithms and visualization tools for the 
results should have intuitive mechanisms 
for displaying confidence. Furthermore, 
sources of variability and bias (e.g., sample 
selection) in the data should be accounted 
for.
• Temporal and spatial information cannot 
be ignored. Such information can be used in 
higher-level analysis; see Section IV.D.
• Compression of information – In a 
semantic graph, what is the trade off 
between the richness of information and 
the ingestion of a large number of facts? It 
was estimated that the number of facts that 
needs to be ingested is of the order of 1015. 
Methods to reliably estimate the intrinsic 
amount of information in a graph are 
needed, especially if those methods can help 
to compress or prune the large-scale graphs 
that DHS is working with.
C. Models for detection and 
prediction on semantic graphs
In the previous section, the focus was on basic 
scalable algorithms and tools for semantic graphs. 
However, straightforward queries alone are not 
sufficient to analyze large-scale graphs. For 
example, relationship analysis only helps when 
the analysts know which entities to focus on. In 
this section, the emphasis is on tools that enable 
more automatic knowledge discovery, enabling 
detection and prediction. In order of importance, 
the focus areas are listed below and discussed in 
greater detail in the following subsections.
1. Scalable algorithms for structure 
identification in graphs to understand the 
underlying structure such as important hubs, 
interesting communities, and so on.
2. Methods for prediction on semantic 
graphs, including identifying missing 
or incorrect information and estimating 
unknown attributes and links. 
3. Consider crosscutting issues such as 
scalability, accounting for measures of 
uncertainty, and including temporal or 
spatial phenomena.
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1. Structure-identifying algorithms for 
semantic graphs
Identifying structure in large-scale graphs is a 
daunting task but can be used for both analysis and 
for accelerating queries.
Consider that Google’s strength lies in identifying 
the structure inherent in the Web. The PageRank 
algorithm, developed by Google founders Sergei 
Brin and Larry Page, uses eigenanalysis to 
estimate a Web page’s importance by analyzing 
the pages that point to that page, and the pages that 
point to those pages, and so on. (This is a powerful 
tool but can and has been exploited by something 
called “link spam.”) Prof. Jon Kleinberg, Cornell 
University, is well known for developing an 
even more powerful concept of “authorities” and 
“hubs.” These techniques can be used to answer 
questions such as “Which nodes are the most 
influential?” This can focus the analyst’s attention 
on important nodes in the graph.
Clustering and partitioning can also be used for 
detecting structure in semantic graphs, which can 
in turn be used for identifying communities and 
for decisions on how to partition the graph for 
parallel computing. Consider, for example, the 
diagram in Figure 18 that shows the email and 
organization structure of HP Labs. The illustration 
shows that the email exchange largely abides 
by the organizational structure. Clustering and 
partitioning can be used to analyze such a graph.
Clustering and partitioning techniques have been 
developed in the field of scientific computing 
where graph partitioning is used to determine 
the distribution of finite-element matrices for 
operations such as parallel matrix-vector multiply. 
Clustering techniques can potentially aid in the 
identification of communities of interest within 
a large-scale semantic graph, again focusing the 
analyst’s attention.
In both cases, the techniques that have been 
developed are only for directed graphs. They need 
to be extended to semantic graphs with different 
node and edge types. Furthermore, both rely on 
large-scale eigenvalue computations, so these 
linear algebra techniques need to be extended to 
massive sizes. Other approaches based on link-
based clustering are also applicable.
2. Methods for prediction on semantic 
graphs, including identifying missing 
or incorrect information and estimating 
unknown attributes
The DHS knows that its data is error prone and 
incomplete. The errors are due to both errors in 
the original data and errors introduced during 
ingestion. Some of the errors in the data may even 
be due to subversive information that is intended 
to mislead. Gaps in the data are due to the fact 
that not everything is in data format. For example, 
two individuals may communicate frequently via 
untraceable means. 
Being able to identify missing or incorrect 
information and to make predictions about 
the future (e.g., these two groups will likely 
begin collaborating because there are several 
key connections between them) are extremely 
valuable tools. These tools could also be useful 
for discovering anomalous nodes, relationships, or 
subgraphs. 
There are some emerging techniques being 
developed for modeling attributes on semantic 
graphs, including relational Bayesian networks, 
relational Markov networks, and relational 
dependency networks. For example, Prof. David 
Jensen of the University of Massachusetts 
discussed his group’s work on using relational 
models to predict which co-authors in physics will 
likely write papers together. Prof. Lise Getoor’s 
group at the University of Maryland has also done 
work on link-based classification and other link-
based prediction tasks. 
Furthermore, Jensen and others are developing 
methods for discovering statistical biases in 
relational learning, which will aid in improving 
machine learning techniques and detecting unusual 
behavior in the presence of background noise.
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3. Crosscutting issues: scalability, 
accounting for measures of uncertainty, 
and including temporal or spatial 
phenomena
In all the above areas of interest, there are 
several crosscutting issues. Once again, a 
primary challenge is scalability. Techniques 
must be developed to scale these methods to the 
enormous DHS data sets. For example, how can 
the eigenanlysis that is so critical for identifying 
underlying structure be extended to graphs with 
billions of nodes?
Most data have accompanying measures of 
uncertainty. All of the algorithms above should be 
adapted to incorporate this information. Finally, 
temporal and spatial information cannot be 
ignored and has a bearing on testing processes, as 
discussed in the next section.
Figure 18: HP Labs’ email communication (light grey lines) mapped 
onto organization hierarchy (black lines). 20
D. Models for discovering and 
detecting processes on graphs
Modeling and detection of processes and structure 
is an important and novel area to consider, which 
may help in answering some of the most difficult 
and complex questions such as: 
• Can patterns in the financial transactions of 
terrorists be detected and exploited?
• What is the structure of power in a group of 
terrorists?
• What were the main topics of intercepted 
terrorist messages over the past five years?
• Can a group that is purposely trying to 
deceive by swapping cell phones with 
innocents be tracked? In other words, can 
such changes be tracked over time?
Researchers are just beginning to understand 
and exploit this new domain, so algorithm 
development and understanding is key. However, 
even if researchers are successful in developing 
algorithms to do the more complex analysis 
outlined above, the methods will be useless 
without a query architecture to support the analyst 
in using the advanced tools.20 Shown on front cover. Figure 3 from Lada Adamic and 
Eytan Adar, “How to search a social network,” preprint 
submitted to Social Networks, October 26, 2004.
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For example, the SQL query architecture returns 
answers to straightforward queries. It can answer 
the question, “State the number of people with 
passports from Italy who passed through customs 
at the JFK airport in January, 2004,” but not 
“Identify individuals whose passports may have 
been forged that passed through customs at the 
JFK airport in January, 2004.”
Analysts may also be interested in queries that 
require finding subgraphs that match any of a 
library of patterns. For example, the query might 
be “Identify any suspicious group of individuals 
that passed through customs at JFK in January, 
2004.” The answer might include things like, 
“Fifteen men between ages 24 and 44, all 
employees of the same chemical processing plant 
and all traveling without their families, flew into 
JFK during the time period in question.”
1. Algorithms to detect processes 
on semantic graphs
Modeling of data allows information to be 
processed more efficiently and also allows 
recognition of the structure of information 
embedded within data. For example, spectral 
decomposition of an audio stream can allow 
extraction of different features, such as 
background noise or the intermingled voices of 
different people. The recognition that spectral 
decomposition of audio can separate these features 
is a crucial observation, and every data source 
holds the potential for such modeling to advance 
the state of the art in moving up the knowledge 
hierarchy.
A variety of mathematical models can be applied 
to data and information in order to form higher-
level structures for the synthesis and extraction of 
higher-level understanding. Successful examples 
can be found in hidden Markov models, Bayesian 
networks, statistical machine learning, and 
conditional random fields.
The mathematical abstraction of models for 
data is crucial for the conception and analysis 
of algorithms for extraction and synthesis of 
information and knowledge. For example, the 
Viterbi algorithm can be used to predict the most 
likely state of a hidden Markov model, and the 
abstraction of events on relational data forms the 
basis for extraction of association rules.
Algorithms such as Hidden Markov models can 
automatically learn how to detect such behavior 
and offer an alternative to rule-based systems. 
Such systems have typically been used on non-
relational data and so need to be adapted to 
relational data and semantic graphs. Recent work 
on probabilistic relational models and statistical 
relational learning are approaches that extend 
statistical modes to relational and semantic graph 
data. 
Much research has been done on studying the 
structure and processes on the World Wide Web, 
and this understanding has been turned into 
design principles. For example, decentralized 
peer-to-peer systems such as Gnutella21 have been 
developed based on random-graph models of 
small-world models. Studies of email traffic have 
also been used to understand the influence and 
communication structure at various companies. 
Once the influence structure is understood, plans 
can be made to, for example, disrupt a network; 
see Figure 19.
2. Identification of subgraphs that are 
undergoing abrupt changes or bursts in 
activity
Clearly DHS data will be dynamic, so algorithms 
that exploit the transient structure of the graph 
will need to designed. For example, discovering 
portions of the graph that are particularly active 
is one possible application. For example, analysts 
may be interested in detecting an intense email 
exchange between suspected terrorists.
One promising line of research was discussed by 
Prof. Jon Kleinberg of Cornell University. There is 
technology to discover “word bursts” in text. Such 
technology has already been adapted by Web sites 
such as Daypop22 to analyze what Webloggers are 
writing about. Kleinberg’s own studies have turned 
up interesting trends in the titles of papers at the 
SIGMOD and VLDB database conferences. 
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For example, terms like “data,” “base,” “schema” 
and “large” were popular in the late 70s. “Object-
oriented” and “parallel” were popular in the late 
80s and early 90s, and more recently terms like 
“warehouse,” “indexing,” and “xml” are prevalent. 
The technology that has been developed so far is 
for documents and not graphs but is an example of 
the type of work that could be adopted.
Eventually, all of these algorithms will needs 
to scale to large sizes. According the Stephen 
Dennis, DHS ISC Deputy Director of Research 
and Engineering, there will be over three million 
relationships to analyze per hour, and it will be 
important to detect both threat and non-threat 
patterns.
3. Using processes and structures for 
improved analysis
In his workshop presentation, Prof. George 
Cybenko of Dartmouth College contended that 
much of the work of analysts is in trying to express 
processes and structures in terms of the limited 
query capabilities on data. Instead, if processes 
and structures were automatically identified in the 
data, then they could be used in interacting with 
the database; see Figure 20.
Exposing and making the process models explicit 
will lead to shareable, large-scale, dynamically 
updatable data analysis capabilities.
In addition to developing algorithms to detect 
processes, interfaces will need to be developed 
so that these processes can be easily understood 
and used by analysts. For example, a possible 
process (i.e., a hypothesis) might be discovered 
by an algorithm and then shown to an analyst. The 
analyst should have the opportunity to not only 
study the process but also label it and save it for 
future use (i.e., find more processes like this one). 
The analyst should also have the capability to 
track changes in the process over time.
E. Algorithms to provably ensure 
privacy and security
Peter Sand, Director of Privacy Technology of 
DHS Privacy Office, spoke at the workshop about 
privacy and the DHS. Precursory information 
about a terrorist event is difficult to discover 
because the terrorists act in secrecy as much 
as possible. Clues of potential terrorist activity 
(movement of money, information, materials, 
and people) are hidden in the vast amount of 
data available to DHS. However, discovering 
these clues requires clever investigation of large 
amounts of data that may have no apparent 
significance and that may also be potentially 
protected by privacy law and policy. Although 
some practitioners may view privacy as an 
obstacle or barrier to using the data, Sand proposes 
an alternative view that privacy should be viewed 
instead as an attribute of the data that must be 
considered along with other attributes. 
Privacy is a politically and emotionally charged 
term and means different things to different 
people. One view of privacy is that it corresponds 
to the control of personal or institutional space. 
From a homeland security perspective, the 
objective is to protect privacy without impeding 
the flow of information needed to identify threats 
and vulnerabilities to the nation’s security. 
Figure 19: Analysis can help in determining 
how to disrupt a network.18
21 http://www.gnutella.com/
22 http://www.daypop.com/
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As Mr. Sand advocated, security safeguards 
and privacy protections should be considered 
an integral part of any information system. The 
following are the R&D needs on the topic of 
privacy and security, in order of importance:
1. An understanding of how privacy and 
security can be integrated into semantic 
graph techniques. For example, if one link 
of a subgraph is protected but is part of the 
answer to a query, is it safe to return the 
remainder of the subgraph to the analyst? 
2. Methods that can automatically account 
for the difference between entities whose 
privacy should be protected and those 
that are not protected, as well as different 
situations where the trade offs on security 
and privacy might be allowed to change, 
i.e., less privacy may be assured when threat 
levels have been elevated or when a search 
warrant has been obtained on a particular 
individual or group of individuals. 
3. Anonymization methods with provable 
privacy guarantees, even in the presence 
of auxiliary data. Many times “anonymous” 
data is released which, when combined with 
other data, reveals private information about 
an individual because the methods do not 
use a definition of anonymity that accounts 
for auxiliary data.
1. An understanding of privacy and 
security in the context of semantic 
graphs
Semantic graphs present complex data access 
issues. It is conceivable that each node and each 
edge in the graph may be assigned a security 
classification. There is the question of how query 
results should be presented when some of the 
data is restricted. If some information is not used 
because it is protected, the impact on the reliability 
of the result may be detrimental. Even presenting 
negative answers and summary answers may 
reveal restricted information. 
23 From the workshop presentation of Prof. George 
Cybenko, Dartmouth College.
Figure 20: Aristotelian queries require that the analyst’s natural cognitive processes be converted into the 
query language whereas Newtonian queries would use cognitive models for representing the queries.23
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For example, consider again Figure 21. If an 
analyst looks for the shortest path between Persons 
15 and 16, but all the “Works at” (purple) edges 
are restricted information, what should the query 
system return? If nodes 15, 16, and 19 are returned 
with the paths deleted, it indicates that there is a 
relationship and that somehow those nodes are 
involved with the relationship. Even a “cannot 
answer the query due to security concerns” 
implicitly indicates that there is a connection and 
that it involves restricted information, which may 
still be more than what should be revealed.
This problem is of critical importance since the 
goal of the DHS ISC includes having multiple 
analysts with multiple levels of authorization 
and need-to-know accessing the same massive 
collection of DHS data.
2. Privacy and security policies that 
account for multiple trust levels
Privacy policies are typically expressed as rules on 
collection, retention, usage, and dissemination. For 
example, P3P (Platform for Privacy Preferences) 
is a W3C standard for Web sites to express their 
privacy policies in a machine-readable format. 
The current state-of-the-art allows enforcement 
of privacy policies for structured data with a 
single trust boundary, e.g., analyze queries to 
the database, and either block the query if it is in 
violation of the privacy policy, allow the query to 
proceed if it is conformant, or modify the query 
to reflect user opt-ins or opt-outs such that the 
modified query will be conformant.
In general, access to data is binary—an analyst 
either has or does not have access. Such an access 
policy does not account for important differences, 
such as the following:
• Multiple levels of trust. While it may not 
be acceptable to have data available directly 
to analysts, it may be acceptable in some 
scenarios to allow a computer to access 
the data. For example, names and personal 
information about truck drivers crossing 
at the border may be restricted from an 
analyst’s view, but it might be allowable for 
the computer to access such information 
for computing statistics (e.g., how many 
different/distinct drivers crossed at a 
particular border point). 
• Access restrictions on data may 
temporarily be lifted in certain emergency 
events. For example, it may be allowable 
to make private passenger data available 
to government in the event of a suspected 
aircraft hijacking.
• Reversible anonymization is a powerful 
technique that allows human beings to look 
at information about a person and only learn 
the identity of the person if the information 
fits a profile of suspicious behavior. The 
challenge is to ensure that the information 
that is suppressed does not affect the 
decision of whether or not the behavior is 
suspicious.
Figure 21: If some edges of classified or other protected 
information, is there any safe way to present aggregate 
results to uncleared users?
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the individual level, whereas data models are built 
at the aggregate level). 
The second approach focuses on privacy 
(sovereignty) of organizational data and uses a 
secure multi-party computation approach to build 
data models across organizations while revealing 
minimal information apart from the data 
model (i.e., the model is built without the 
organizations sharing the underlying data). 
One of the main failings of the techniques 
that have been developed up until now is 
that they fail to use rigorous definitions 
of privacy that account for auxiliary 
information. 
For example, if a person’s medical records 
are released without a name but did include 
a street address, gender, and age, it is 
fairly obvious that the information can be 
combined with other sources of information 
(e.g., credit reports, voter records, etc.) to 
reveal private information. 
3. Anonymization methods with provable 
statistical privacy guarantees
A primary issue with respect to privacy and 
security is that the release of data that should not 
be identifiable with individuals often is identifiable 
when it is combined with data from other sources. 
For example, Prof. Latanya Sweeney, Carnegie 
Mellon University, discussed the example of the 
release of sanitized medical 
records which, when combined 
with publicly available voter 
registration information, 
did reveal private medical 
information about individual 
patients. Sweeney discussed 
other examples as well, 
including the fact that pixilation 
can actually improve facial 
recognition; see Figure 22.
There are several approaches 
to anonymizing data. One can 
release only partial information, 
for example, just the first three 
digits of a zip code. Or, one 
can use data perturbation. In 
either case, the goal is to protect 
privacy in individual records 
while still allowing the building 
of accurate data models at the aggregate level 
(leveraging the fact that one cares about privacy at 24 From the workshop presentation of Prof. Latanya Sweeney, 
Carnegie Mellon University.
Figure 22: Pixelation of images has been shown 
to improve facial recognition.24
Figure 23: The date of birth, gender, and 5-digit zip uniquely 
identifies 87.1% of the US population.24
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Figure 24: Abstraction of sanitization of data. Auxiliary information (AUX) must not 
aid in the revelation of any santizied (SAN) information.25
25 From the workshop presentation of Dr. Cynthia Dwork, 
Microsoft Research.
Subtle variations of this problem crop up 
repeatedly, including the release of census data. 
This is termed re-identification, i.e., the process of 
linking anonymous data to the actual identity of 
an individual. Prof. Sweeney has also shown that 
nearly 9 out of every 10 people in the U.S. can be 
uniquely identified by their date of birth, gender, 
and zip code; see Figure 23.
Using proper definitions to define privacy is 
critical to properly implement privacy policies and 
practices. Dr. Cynthia Dwork, Microsoft Research, 
explained the complexities of adequately defining 
privacy and stressed the importance of doing it 
correctly; see Figure 24 for a description of the 
type of model that should be used for properly 
testing the sanitization of data. The idea is that a 
sanitized database (SAN) should not reveal any 
more information about a given database (RDB) 
than can already be determined with known 
auxillary information (AUX).
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We have reviewed the many research challenges 
faced by homeland security applications, not 
the least of which is the unprecedented scale 
and complexity of the data in homeland security 
applications. Fast progress will only be possible if 
many top researchers from diverse communities, 
including discrete mathematics, sociology, 
computer science, and statistics, can be persuaded 
to enthusiastically join the effort. The following 
measures are critical components to ensure 
excellence in R&D on data sciences technology 
for DHS:
• Strong support for open research is vital. 
Open research in knowledge discovery 
algorithms encourages wide scrutiny from 
the technical community, identifies and 
remedies technical errors, and makes the 
capabilities and limitations of algorithms 
known widely and known with confidence. 
Examples of open algorithms include 
Linux, Internet protocols, and public key 
cryptography. 
• Release of test data for competitive 
analysis. Realistic test data, including 
metadata and analysis objectives, are the 
raw material needed to spur advances in 
algorithms, analysis and visualization. Such 
data could be released for competitions 
sponsored by various conferences such 
as KDD or the Statistical Computing and 
Graphics sections of the American Statistical 
Association.
• Visiting Scientist and Analyst Programs. 
Deeper immersion in homeland security 
problems and close, sustained contact 
with DHS analysts will focus the R&D to 
best support the DHS. Visiting scientist 
positions could range from 10 week summer 
internships to year-long sabbaticals. 
Conversely, sending analysts to spend time 
at the various research locations would give 
them a sense of what’s new on the horizon 
and give them the chance to help shape 
research.
• Post-doctoral fellowship positions. 
Enticing the best new scientists to join the 
DHS R&D programs will require attractive 
post-doctoral positions, such as named 
fellowships with attractive stipends. 
• Summer institutes. Focused workshops 
lasting from one week to three months, 
especially during the summer, offer a venue 
for bringing the best academic and lab 
researchers together in a forum where they 
can focus exclusively on a single problem. 
Measures such as these will assure the success of 
the DHS R&D program on semantic graphs.
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